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FEATURE
ARTICLES
The Limits on the Use of Tort Law
To Encourage Consumer Safety
Sarah L. Olson
Anne G. Kimball

Introduction
Consumer safety is one of the fundamental
reasons for courts' universal application of strict liability
and negligence principles to product design,
manufacture, warnings and sale. When litigants part
ways with traditional notions of product liability and
negligence law in suits involving firearms, however, they
also move well past the enunciated goal of promoting
consumer safety into a larger discussion of societal goals
in relation to violence. There are limits to the lengths that
product liability and negligence law can be stretched to
accommodate more generalized societal concerns over
violently inflicted injury. This attempt at expanding
negligence law is clear in the realm of tort-based firearms
litigation, when plaintiffs seek to impose liability for the
criminal, intentional or accidental injuries caused by use
of a non-defective and lawfully sold firearm. Neither the
law nor public policy supports the expansion of tort law
from a vehicle for promoting individual consumer safety
into a means to further societal or legislative ends.
The basic premises that limit the application of tort
law in product-related cases are simple and based on
common sense. Because manufacturers are not insurers
of all harms that can be occasioned by the use of their
products, a product must be defective or unreasonably
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dangerous in design, manufacture or warnings for
liability to attach. Manufacturers cannot be liable to
remedy what they do not control. Where injuries stem
from product uses or from open and obvious
characteristics which are not defective, manufacturers
have no means, short of discontinuing production, to
respond. Similarly, the extent to which liability for
negligence may be alleged and imposed is limited by
concepts of duty and proximate cause. Unless the
manufacturer stands in a relationship with the injuring or
injured party such that it can control the conduct of one
and prevent harm to the other, neither a breached duty
nor a causal connection between breach and injury can
arise.
By examining the history of tort-based claims
against firearm manufacturers over the last twenty-five
years, one can perceive the outline of principles which
protect consumers in individual cases but restrict the
application of tort law to promote more general societal
goals. This article addresses these principles:
I. A product must actually be defective for
tort liability to be imposed against its
manufacturer for injuries sustained during its
use.
A. The risk-utility test for product defect
does not measure social utility generally.
A
product is not defective based solely on
B.
the fact that it can be used - criminally,
intentionally or accidentally - to inflict
injury.
II. Product warnings are intended to protect those
to whom dangers are not obvious. Where a
danger inherent in a product is open and
obvious, no warning is required.
III. Tort liability cannot be imposed where a
manufacturer has no relationship with the
injured party, the injuring party, or the product
that causes injury at the time that an injury
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occurs.
IV. For tort liability to be imposed, the
manufacturer must control the risk at the time
of injury.

I. To Impose Tort Liability, A Product Must
Actually Be Defective
The threshold requirement of any tort claim based
upon the operation of a product, regardless of the theory
on which it is brought, is the identification of a product
2
defect which proximately causes the plaintiff's injury. In
the forty years that have elapsed since product liability
theory took root, a philosophical and legal battle has
raged around the scope of protection it provides. One
element of this debate can be framed as follows: Does
product liability law apply to products which are in
themselves not defective in condition, but which can be
used to inflict harm? In the context of firearm litigation,
the courts' answer has been a resounding "No."
The central inquiry in these cases is not whether
through its normalfunction a firearm is capable of
causing harm, but whether an unreasonably dangerous
defect in its condition does so. Almost without exception,
the tort law of all fifty states has rejected the proposition
that the function of a product, as opposed to its
condition, can constitute a defect. In the firearm context,
this rule has been uniform.3 A defective product:
Is one which, at the time it leaves the seller's
hands, is in a condition not reasonably
contemplated by the ultimate consumer and is
unreasonably dangerous for its intended use.
If, in fact, a firearm is sold in a defective condition,
a product liability suit (if even required) can amply
redress an individual plaintiff's wrongs and simultaneously
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protect other consumers by encouraging the manufacturer
to correct the specific flaw.
Notwithstanding this explicit threshold
requirement of defect, however, many plaintiffs in
firearm cases fail to allege a legally cognizable defect in
the firearm with which they have been injured. Instead,
over the last twenty-five years, plaintiffs have often
contended that because a firearm has the inherent
capacity to be used to inflict death or serious injury, the
product is itself defacto defective. This is contended even
though the firearm is perfectly manufactured, operates
exactly as designed and intended by the user, is
accompanied by copious warnings, and produces no
injury to the "consumer." Under the guise of a traditional
product liability claim, these plaintiffs argue that their
complaints state valid causes of action by alleging that a
particular firearm is too small, too concealable, of "too
high a caliber," "too powerful" or simply because it has
the capacity to inflict serious injury. This argument
mischaracterizes the meaning of "defect" under the law
of any state; all of these characteristics are inherent in or
flow from the function of firearms, not a defect in the
condition of a specific firearm.
In the face of this protracted debate, courts have
held firm to the principle that without a product defect
there can be no tort claim against firearm manufacturers
under either product liability or negligence
theories. For
5
example, in Pattersonv. Rohm Gesellschaft, a convenience
store robber shot and killed plaintiff's daughter, using a
revolver in the crime. Plaintiff filed suit against the
manufacturer of the firearm claiming, among other
things, that the revolver was unreasonably dangerous
and should not have been distributed to the public
because of the general prevalence of handgun use in
crime. Rejecting this argument the court noted that:
[t]he unconventional theories advanced in this
case ... are totally without merit, a misuse of
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products liability laws. It makes no sense to
characterize any product as "defective" - even
a handgun - if it performs as intended and
causes iniury only because it is intentionally
misused.
Similarly, New York trial and appellate courts
rejected claims by victims of the infamous criminal
rampage by Colin Ferguson aboard the Long Island Rail
Road in December of 1993, which left six people dead.7
The plaintiffs contended that the model of Sturm, Ruger
pistol used by Ferguson was defectively designed
because it purportedly had "no legitimate sporting
purpose" and was "completely unnecessary for selfdefense." In support of this assertion, plaintiffs pointed
to the pistol's size and design, which permitted the easy
removal and replacement of ammunition magazines.
Plaintiffs made no allegation that the specific pistol used
by Ferguson had malfunctioned or was defective in
condition; indeed, the facts alleged clearly indicated that
the firearm had functioned precisely as designed and as
Ferguson intended, with tragic results.
Granting the manufacturer's motion to dismiss,
the trial court observed that plaintiffs were, in fact,
complaining of the very function of the firearm and the
risks which attend that function. As the court noted:
The risk of a gun lies in its function and not a
defect in the product. A gun is designed to fire
a bullet which is capable of killing or seriously
injuring another. It is difficult to discern an
alternative design which would reduce the
likelihood of injury without changing its
function.9
Because plaintiffs could not identify any defect in the
condition of the specific firearm in question, they could
not pursue a product liability or negligence action
against its manufacturer.
A similar result was obtained in Addison v. Cody
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Wayne Williams.'0 In Addison, Mr. Williams fired 55 rounds
from a semi-automatic rifle through the steel doors of a
bar, killing one person and injuring five others. The
Louisiana appellate court rejected plaintiffs' theory that
the firearm was defective because it was "too powerful,"
"attractive to criminals," and had "no purpose except to
kill human beings," stating:
The primary or basic function of a gun is to
fire a bullet capable of killing. A gun that has
the capacity to shoot and kill, which is its
primary function, cannot be said to be
unreasonably dangerous per se because it has
that capacity. A product cannot be said to be
unreasonably dangerous per se where the
danger complained of is the purpose and
function of the product .... [Aill guns are
dangerous and have the capacity to kill. Each
type of gun has characteristics that make it
more dangerous than another type, depending
on the circumstances of its use .... Thus,
attempting to characterize one type of gun as
presenting a greater risk of harm or as being
more susceptible to criminal misuse than
another type becomes extremely tenuous...
The manufacturers of the weapon and the
ammunition used in it are not liable for
injuries resulting from the intentional criminal
misuse of the gun.u
Every jurisdiction that has considered the
application of product liability law to firearm
manufacturers for injuries inflicted with non-defective
firearms has rejected plaintiffs' efforts to expand this
theory to such radical lengths. 12 In each case, courts have
held that plaintiffs do not state a product liability cause
of action by asserting that a firearm is defective based on
its function rather than a flaw in its condition, regardless
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of how that assertion is specifically framed.
A. The Risk-Utility Test For Product Defect Does
Not Measure Social Utility Generally
Frustrated by courts' unwillingness to expand
product liability law to situations where a non-defective
firearm has been used to cause injury, plaintiffs have
invoked the risk-utility test by which a product's design
is assessed in some states. In the seminal case of Barker v.
Lull EngineeringCo., 13 the California Supreme Court
adopted this test, which weighs the risks associated with
the use of a specific product as designed, against its
specific uses and usefulness. Other courts have adopted
the same test to determine whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous. This test considers the
usefulness and desirability of the specific product; the
likelihood that, as configured, it will cause injury; the
probable severity of injury; the existence of alternative
feasible designs; the ability to eliminate the danger
without compromising the usefulness of the product; the
user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of
reasonable care;14and the ability of the manufacturer to
spread the loss.
In applying the risk-utility test to firearms that
function as designed (and often as their user intended)
however, litigants have attempted to inappropriately
expand that concept to situations it was never intended
to address, even under Barker v. Lull. Risk-utility is an
analysis of alternative formulations of a product, that is,
of the specific design incorporated into an individual
product. It does not encompass a consideration of the
social utility per se of a category of products, for example,
the usefulness of all toasters, regardless of manufacturer
or model. The test measures the risk of a particular
formulation of a product against the given use of the
product, not against its usefulness as a social concept.
This interpretation of the risk-utility test is not
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only supported by explicit formulations of risk-utility
analysis; it is also implicit in the factual circumstances of
the cases that discuss that theory. For example, in McKay
v. Sandmold Systems, Inc., the issue was not the design of
muller machines in any foundry, but rather whether the
door on a specific muller should have been equipped
with a limit switch so that the machine could not be
started with the door open. In Burch v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co.,17 the issue was the danger inherent in the use of a
particular electric lawn mower designed without a dead
man's switch, not the danger inherent in all lawn mowers
because they utilize rotating sharp blades to accomplish
their objective. In Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.,18
plaintiffs stated a cause of action by alleging that a
specific circular saw was defectively designed in that it
permitted an excessive amount of blade to be exposed,
leading to plaintiff's particular injury. The cause of action
was not based on the fact that all circular saws have the
capacity to cause laceration even when used as designed
and intended. The underlying theme of the risk-utility
test is the premise that this concept applies only when
"something goes wrong with a product," not every time
an individual is injured during its use.
Product liability cases involving firearms illustrate
the limits drawn by the law on the application of the riskutility test as a measure of product design. For example,
in the early case of DeRosa v. Remington Arms, Inc., a
police officer died when his partner accidentally
discharged a shotgun. The plaintiff alleged that the
shotgun fired because the trigger pull was "too light."
Applying the risk-utility test of product defect, the court
held that the firearm was not unreasonably dangerous as
a matter of law simply by virtue of its function.
Pointing out that ".... a gun [must] be designed so that it
finally can be fired... ," the court aptly stated:
Sadly, it must be acknowledged that: [m]any
products, however well-built or well-designed
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may cause injury or death. Guns may kill;
knives may maim; liquor may cause
alcoholism; but the mere fact of injury does
not entitle the [person injured] to recover ....
[T]here must be something wrong with the
product, and if nothing is wrong there will be
no liability.22
In other words, even when the risk-utility test is
the measure of product defectiveness, there must be an
actual defect alleged in a specific product before the test
is applied.
In Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., the court
considered plaintiff's argument that a handgun, which
performed without malfunction in the murder of the
decedent, should be evaluated under the risk-utility
analysis. The court disagreed:
We believe.., that the risk-utility test is
inapplicable to the present situation. This
standard is only applied when something goes
wrong with a product .... [1]n the case of a
handgun which injured a person in whose
direction it was fired, the product worked
precisely as intended. Therefore, the riskutility test cannot be extended to impose
liability on the maker or marketer of a
handgun which has not malfunctioned. 24
Despite these consistent rulings, plaintiffs
continue to attempt to use the risk-utility test as a way of
stating a product liability cause of action in cases
involving firearms that function precisely as designed
and, often, as intended, and they cite to cases like O'Brien
25
26
v. Muskin Corp. or Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword. These
cases, however, involve the evaluation of the condition of
a specific product (such as the slippery nature of the
bottom of a particular swimming pool or the absence of
devices to prevent small children from using a specific
cigarette lighter), not the function of the product (to hold
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water or to start a flame). In contrast, plaintiffs in firearm
cases often attempt to use the risk-utility test to condemn
thefunction of the product (to discharge a bullet when the
trigger is pulled), rather than its condition (for example, a
firearm which emits lead or gases which strike the
shooter's hand when it is fired). Using the O'Brien
swimming pool example, the proper analogy would be
whether the manufacturer of a non-defective swimming
pool, which properly holds water as its primary function,
may be held liable when someone intentionally holds
another under water and drowns him or her because the
instrumentality of the pool was employed (and
employable) for carrying out the criminal act. Courts
have overwhelmingly agreed that the risk-utility test
cannot be applied to "create" a defect in condition in this
way; rather, that test is appropriate only where there is an
underlying defect in condition to evaluate.
B. A Product Is Not Defective Because It Can Be
Used To Inflict Injury
Rather than squarely addressing the requisite
elements of a product liability claim, plaintiffs sometimes
allege that the inherent function of a firearm - that it will
discharge a bullet if all of the steps necessary to do so are
taken - constitutes the required defect. Although not
limited to these circumstances, the flaw in these
plaintiffs' cases is most obvious where injury or death by
gunshot wound was the very result intended by the
shooter.
A firearm, which necessarily must be capable of
being fired or otherwise it would not be a firearm, is not
defective merely because it is capable of being used
during a criminal act or suicide to inflict intended harm.
If a firearm may be found to be defective because it fires a
projectile when the trigger is intentionally pulled, a knife
or a pair of scissors is defective because it will cut, and
gasoline is defective because it will ignite.
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As noted above, state tort law does not support
such claims because, in the absence of a defect in the
condition of the firearm, no product liability cause of
action can be stated. Moreover, in many states, courts
have found that plaintiffs cannot state a cause of action
where injury has been intentionally inflicted. Here, the
acts of the shooter prevent the plaintiff from showing
that his or her injuries were proximately caused by any
act or omission of the defendant or by any defect in its
product. Thus, courts across the country have held that
firearm manufacturers are not liable in tort for injuries
that result from the intentional functioning of a firearm,
whether or not the resulting harm is intended.2
Even though issues of proximate cause are
ordinarily factual questions for the jury to decide, courts
may determine as a matter of law that a plaintiff cannot
281
allege or satisfy this requirement as a matter of law. In
these instances, proximate cause acts as a limit on the
scope of product-related tort claims that may be pursued.
Where a firearm is used to injure oneself or another
deliberately, its inherent capacity to do so is a result of its
function, not a defect in condition. Therefore, liability
cannot attach.

II. Product Warnings Are Not Required When
The Danger Is Obvious
A substantial number of cases in which plaintiffs
raise product liability or negligence claims against
firearm manufacturers include allegations that a
particular product's warnings were inadequate. Whether
warnings are attacked on product liability grounds (an
inadequate warning causes a product to be defective) or
on negligence grounds (the manufacturer's conduct in
supplying inadequate warnings was unreasonable), these
claims all require the following basic elements. First, the
product must contain a latent or undisclosed defect that
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posed a risk to the consumer. Furthermore, the warnings
that accompanied the product did not adequately warn
the consumer of that defect or did not give instructions
on how to safely use the product. Finally, the consumer
was injured as a proximate result of that inadequate
warning about the risk.29
Embedded in this set of criteria is the assumption
that the injured consumer did not already know about
the risk that ultimately caused his or her injury. "As a
general rule, a manufacturer does not have a duty to
warn customers of dangers inherent in the manufacturer's
product if those dangers are generally known and
recognized by the ordinary consumer. 3 0 Under the law
of many states, manufacturers simply have no duty to
warn of an open and obvious danger. As one court noted,
it is simply not "necessary to tell a zookeeper to keep his
head out of the hippopotamus' mouth." 3' An open and
obvious danger is one which is "plain enough [that it
ought to] be seen by anyone." 32 Courts around the
country have frequently supported this principle, in both
the firearm and other product contexts. Thus, where the
dangers associated with the use of a particular product
are open and obvious to the reasonable consumer, or are
specifically known by the plaintiff, liability cannot be
established and inadequate warnings claims will be
dismissed in many jurisdictions.
The risks associated with owning, using and
storing firearms, including the risk that they may be
criminally, intentionally or accidentally misused, are
dangers made open and obvious35
by the very nature and
function of firearms themselves. In many states, the
obvious nature of the danger associated with firearm use
is reflected in criminal statutes and common law that
assume specific intent to commit homicide
36 from the act of
pointing a firearm at a person and firing. Based upon
the well-known function of firearms, "[tihe act of
pointing a firearm and firing it in the direction of another
human being is an act with death as a natural and
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probable consequence."37 This is a fact with which even
school children are familiar.38 As the court succinctly
noted in Mavilia v. Stoeger Industries, "that death may
result from careless handling of
,39 firearms is known by all
Americans from an early age." Similarly, the acts of an
individual who intends to commit suicide using a firearm
cannot form the basis for any claim resting on a failure to
warn.
Over the years, plaintiffs have also asserted that
the warnings that accompany firearms upon sale by their
manufacturers are inadequate because they do not warn
that the firearm may be stolen and subsequently used in
crime. However, it has been obvious since at least biblical
times that a possibility exists that a criminal may steal
one's small, valuable, portable possessions. Common
sense and common law dictate that a product manufacturer
does not have a duty to warn consumers of the obvious
danger that arises when its products are stolen from the
consumer's home.4 1 This specifically applies to the theft
of firearms, the risk of which is well known. 42 Further, it
is clear that there are persons in our society who will use
various products, including but not limited to firearms,
gasoline, water, rope, knives, electricity, poison,
automobiles, chains and baseball bats to inflict harm
upon others. The manufacturers of these products can
have no duty to warn consumers of a fact that has long
been a tragic social reality.
Where no duty to warn exists, no duty to recall is
justified, even in those states
that impose such a post-sale
43
duty on manufacturers. A duty to recall arises out of the
presence of a latent, unexpected danger about which a
warning would or should have been given, had the
danger been
recognized at the time of sale of the
44
product. Where the dangers associated with the
intentional use or misuse of a product are obvious,
neither a duty to warn nor a duty to recall can be
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imposed under the law.

III. Imposition of A Duty Requires A
Relationship Between the Parties
While no duty exists in the examples above, it is
not accurate to say that product manufacturers do not
owe any duties towards consumers of their products. For
example, product manufacturers have a non-delegable
duty to manufacture products free
45 from dangerous latent
defects in construction or design. Manufacturers have a
corresponding duty to test adequately and to inspect
products before their sale.4 Additionally, manufacturers
have a duty to warn consumers about latent or hidden
dangers associated with its products and to provide
instructions for their safe use. Other duties are specified
by various states' common law. Over the last twenty-five
years, however, a dispute has raged in negligence suits
against firearm manufacturers, parallel to the debate in
product liability cases over the definition of "defect." In
negligence suits, the threshold dispute has been whether
plaintiffs are seeking to impose a recognized duty on
defendants that the law currently does recognize, or
whether plaintiffs are seeking to impose an entirely new
duty without foundation in the law.
Because plaintiffs often assert previously
unrecognized duties against firearm manufacturers, the
first question presented is whether such a duty actually
exists. The answer is, in every jurisdiction, a question of
law for the court. In fixing a duty, it is the court's
obligation "to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a
controllable degree" 49 so as to protect against crushing
exposure to liability.50
In many negligence-based cases involving
firearms, plaintiffs have sought to impose a "duty" to
refrain from lawfully selling a non-defective product to
those members of the public entitled to purchase them

Volume 12, Number 3 2000

Loyola Consumer Law Review

under the law. In these cases, plaintiffs have not alleged
any illegality on the part of the firearm manufacturers.
Rather, plaintiffs assert that simply by placing into the
stream of commerce a lawful and non-defective product
that has the capacity to be misused for illegal ends, the
defendant has breached a duty to the plaintiffs.
Alternatively, plaintiffs claim that firearm manufacturers
have a duty to police the entire distribution chain of their
products.
Courts have generally disagreed with the theories
mentioned above. 5' Absent something "wrong" with a
firearm, courts have overwhelmingly ruled that a
manufacturer does not owe any duty to remotely located
individuals to refrain from lawfully distributing its
products
to people or entities that may legally purchase
52
53
them. For example, in Pattersonv. Rohm Gesellschaft, a
U.S. district court found that the firearm manufacturer
was under no common law duty to regulate the
distribution of or to refrain from marketing its nondefective firearms to members of the public with whom it
never had any contact or relationship. Many other
courts have agreed by specifically rejecting claims that a
firearms manufacturer can be liable for negligence where
there is neither an allegation nor evidence that the
manufacturer had any relationship with, or any control
over, either the injured party or the individual who
inflicted injury using a firearm.
In fact, various legislative enactments on both
state and federal levels have already predetermined for
firearm manufacturers who may lawfully purchase or
possess their products. Legislatures have repeatedly
considered this subject for more than a hundred years
and have determined whether, and under what
conditions, citizens may purchase, own or possess
firearms as a matter of public policy.56 For example,
pursuant to federal law, a firearm manufacturer may sell
firearms only to other federally licensed firearm
manufacturers, federally licensed firearm importers,
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federally licensed 57
firearm dealers or federally licensed
firearm collectors. The Firearms and Explosives
Licensing Center of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms ("BATF") is charged with investigating the
qualifications of every applicant for such a federal
firearms license. Firearm manufacturers must keep
detailed records of each product they manufacture and/or
sell, including type, model, caliber, serial number,
purchaser's identity, address and other required
information. Firearm manufacturers cannot ship any
firearm that does not bear, among other things, a unique
and permanent serial number and the manufacturer's
identity.59 Every firearm produced and sold by a firearm
manufacturer must be regularly accounted for to the
BATF either by documenting its legal sale or by showing
that it is still in the manufacturer's possession.
Many more federal regulations govern firearm
manufacture and distribution. In addition, each state
establishes it own civil, criminal and regulatory structure
to control firearm distribution, ownership, possession
and use within the state. Municipalities and counties
likewise regulate firearm ownership, distribution and
use. In all of these statutory and regulatory schemes, the
courts have placed the primary burden of monitoring
and overseeing the lawful distribution of firearms on the
retail seller, which is usually the only entity which has
contact with individual consumers.
Why doesn't a duty arise to avoid selling an
otherwise lawful and non-defective product because it
might be used to injure another? The short and pragmatic
answer is that human beings are endlessly creative in
their mischief. Shifting the burden of that mischief to the
manufacturer which has lawfully sold a perfectly sound
inanimate object moves society further away from
addressing the cause and prevention of injury, rather
than closer.
The legal answer is also simple. Tort-based duties
do not exist in the abstract. Rather, they only arise on the
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basis of relationships, which may create in one person a
duty to control another's actions and a correspondink
obligation to protect third parties from those actions.
The existence of a direct relationship between the
defendant and an injury-inflicting actor provides the
defendant with at least theoretical control and an
opportunity to intervene to prevent injury, creating in
some circumstances a duty to do so. Alternatively, a
preexisting relationship between the defendant and an
injured person can hypothetically permit the defendant
to protect, and thus avoid injury to, that person. In the
absence of a direct relationship with either the injurer or
the injured, however, a product manufacturer has no
ability to influence the outcome. The liability imposed on
manufacturers under these circumstances is absolute and
more akin to an insurance scheme than to tort liability.
Thus, in the absence of a direct relationship - whether
parent/child; employer/ employee; landlord/ tenant;
common carrier/passenger or other - the law has
63
determined that no duty can arise.
A duty to control the acts of criminals or to protect
another against the criminal acts of a third party is
naturally even more circumscribed, and requires that the
defendant have an actual, not just theoretical, relationship
with and control over the third party's conduct for
liability to attach. 64 The Elsroth case is particularly
illuminating. Plaintiffs brought suit against
pharmaceutical maker Johnson & Johnson after the
decedent was poisoned as a result of criminal tampering
with a bottle of Extra-Strength Tylenol. 65 Plaintiffs
complained that defendant's packaging had "enhanced"
the risk of criminal tampering. In dismissing product
liability and negligence claims against the manufacturer,
the court aptly stated that "[t]he doctrine of strict
products liability.. .was not created as a lever to control
the criminal conduct of persons over whom manufacturers
and retailers have no control." 66 Although the court
recognized that the random death of innocents was an
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egregious injustice, it concluded that" ... a second
[injustice] would be perpetrated were we to permit
recovery against these
defendants for a wrong they did
S 67
commit."
not truly
That crime is a foreseeable fact of human society
and injury from crime is sure to result, is simply not
enough standing alone to create a duty to prevent or
restrict the lawful distribution of a non-defective firearm.
This lesson is illustrated by Buczkowski v. McKay, in which
the Michigan Supreme Court refused to impose a duty on
the basis of a "fiction of foreseeability." 68 In that case,
plaintiff's decedent was shot shortly after an individual
purchased a firearm from the defendant retailer. Plaintiff
claimed that the retailer should have foreseen that a
crime would be committed based on the customer's
demeanor. The Michigan high court concluded that even
though a buyer/seller relationship existed between the
retailer-defendant and the customer-shooter, that
particular relationship was not sufficient to create a duty
on the part of the retailer to foresee and forestall
69
subsequent injury to a third party.
In reaching this conclusion, the court followed the
position enunciated by Oliver Wendell Holmes in
rejecting the concept that foreseeability alone creates a
duty:
If notice [foreseeability] so determined is the
general ground for liability, why is not a man
who sells firearms answerable for assaults
committed with pistols bought of him, since
he must be taken to know the probability that,
sooner or later, someone will buy a pistol from
him for some unlawful end? ...The Principle
is pretty well established.., that everyone has
a right to rely upon his fellow-man to act
lawfully and, therefore, is not answerable for
himself acting upon the assumption that they
will do so, however improbable it may be.70
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Unless a manufacturer has a direct relationship
with a criminal actor and the ability to control his or her
actions, the imposition of a fictional duty to prevent a
specific crime at some undetermined future time and
place creates a scheme of absolute liability in which the
manufacturer must insure any injury intentionally
caused with its products. Tort law simply does not
contemplate such sweeping and limitless shifts of
responsibility. As the Supreme Court of New York
County has pointed out:
While it may be argued that a gun
manufacturer has a moral duty to prevent or
reduce the likelihood of injury to shooting
victims, by not designing and marketing [a
specific type of] hand guns, to impose a legal
duty here would create limitless liability. This
would be inappropriate because.., the gun/
ammunition manufacturer has no control over
the actions of a criminal whose goal might be
to randomly kill or seriously injure innocent
people.

IV. For Tort Liability To Be Imposed, the
Manufacturer Must Control the Risk at the
Time of Injury
Over the past two decades, plaintiffs have
attempted to establish liability on the part of
manufacturers for injuries sustained through product use
by invoking alternative, more tenuous tort theories. Two
theories have gained particular favor among plaintiffs, if
not in the courts: absolute liability for ultrahazardous
activities and liability for creating a public nuisance.
However, efforts to apply these theories to productrelated injuries suffer from a major flaw - the absence of
control by the product manufacturer over the injury-
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causing instrument or person at the time that injury
occurs.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519(1) sets the
following standard for imposing absolute liability for
ultrahazardous activities:
One who carries on an abnormally dangerous
activity is subject to liability for harm to the
person, land or chattels of another resulting
from the activity, although he has exercised
the utmost care to prevent the harm. 72
Many states have adopted this principle in certain,
limited circumstances.73 Typically, these cases involve the
use of property that is under the defendant's control at
the time the plaintiff sustains an injury. In New York, for
example, ultrahazardous activity theory has 74formed the
basis for liability in cases involving blasting, the
collection of a quantity of water or other natural
resources in a dangerous location, 75 dredging property
adjacent to plaintiffs' land,76 or contamination of a
neighbor's property by spillagg of chemicals, oil or other
allegedly harmful substances.
Where absolute liability has been imposed, the
courts' rulings have been premised on the ability of the
responsible party to control and/or eliminate the specific
risk of which plaintiff complains. In all activities
traditionally classified as abnormally dangerous, the
party against whom liability is sought controls the risk at
the time of the injury-producing activity. Thus, those who
store or blast with explosives, store oil or gas, or dredge
channels have been found liable under this doctrine.
However, absolute liability has not been imposed on the
manufacturer of the explosives, the producer of the oil or
gas, or the manufacturer of the dredger. The reason for
this distinction is clear: A manufacturer typically has
neither control nor custody over the risk at the time of
injury.
In the firearm context, courts have universally
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rejected efforts to apply the ultrahazardous activity
theory to the manufacture and sale of lawful, nondefective products. Every court that has specifically
considered whether the manufacture and lawful sale of
non-defective firearms are ultrahazardous or abnormally
dangerous activities has ultimately rejected plaintiffs'
theory. For example, in Martin v. Harrington&
Richardson, Inc.,79 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of an Illinois federal district court
dismissing plaintiffs' ultrahazardous activity claim for
failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court
found that "[p]laintiffs' claim, in essence, is that
manufacturing and selling handguns to the public is an
ultrahazardous activity that gives rise to strict liability for
any damage done by the guns." The court explained the
flaw in plaintiffs' argument:
[I]t blurs the distinction between strict liability
for selling unreasonably dangerous products
and strict liability for engaging in
ultrahazardous activities by making the sale of
a product an activity. Accepting plaintiffs'
argument would run counter to Illinois' longstanding requirement that strict liability for
the sale of a product be limited to
unreasonably dangerous products. Illinois has
never imposed liability upon a non-negligent
manufacturer of a product that is not
defective."1
Some courts have gone further to conclude that
the intervention of substandard conduct by a third
person precludes the classification of an activity as
ultrahazardous as a matter of law. In Kent v. Gulf States
Utitlity Co.," the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to
classify transmission of electricity over high-tension
power lines as an ultrahazardous activity, despite the
known risks to neighboring persons and property. In
making this determination, the court observed that when
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transmission of electricity results in injury, it is almost
always because of substandard conduct on the part of
someone other than the electric company From the
perspective of public policy, the court determined that
absolute liability irrespective of fault was not appropriate
under those circumstances. The court stated:
It is noteworthy that, in each of the activities
placed in this special [ultrahazardous activity]
category by decisions of Louisiana courts, the
enterpriser is almost invariably the sole cause
of the damage and the victim seldom had the
ability to protect himself. No decisions have
placed in this category any activities in which
the victim or a third person can reasonably be
expected to be a contributing factor in the
causation of damages with any degree of
frequency.
In cases where non-defective firearms are lawfully
marketed to those in the "general public" who are
entitled to purchase them and are subsequently used to
intentionally or accidentally inflict injury, a third person
can reasonably be expected to be a contributing factor in
the causation of injury in every instance. Put differently,
"[t]he marketing of a handgun is not dangerous in and of
itself, and when injury occurs, it is not the direct result of
the sale itself, but rather the result of actions taken by a
84
third party." Having no control over the product or the
situation, where the manufacturer is incapable of
eliminating the risk of injury; courts recognize that
absolute liability has no basis in the law.
Courts have also generally rejected a cause of
action for public nuisance against the manufacturer of a
non-defective, lawful product for injuries arising from
the conduct of third parties subsequent to its sale. For
example, in City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse, the City
sued Monsanto Corporation, claiming that improper
disposal of PCBs manufactured by Monsanto and sold to
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Westinghouse had polluted the City's water treatment
system. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of its nuisance
claims against Monsanto. The appellate court found that
Monsanto could not be liable because "the pleadings
[did] not set forth facts from which it could be concluded
that Monsanto retained the
to control
the PCBs beyond
• right
1
,86
the point of sale to Westinghouse." Further, the court
found that Westinghouse was "in control of the product it
purchased and was solely responsible for the nuisance
,,87
created by not safely disposing of the product.
Other courts have agreed and have applied the
requirement of control in dismissing nuisance claims
against manufacturers of lawful, non-defective products.
For example, in City of Manchester v. National Gypsum
Co., 88 plaintiff sued the manufacturers of asbestos
products used in schools and public buildings in
Manchester, New Hampshire. Plaintiff based its
complaint on multiple theories, including the claim that
the asbestos manufacturers had created a public nuisance
by using asbestos in public buildings. After acknowledging
that the concept of public nuisance is comprehensive, the
district court nonetheless found that control over the
asbestos at the time of the alleged injury was "a basic
element of the tort of nuisance."8 9 Because plaintiff had
failed to allege such control and, by virtue of the facts
pled would never be able to plead such control, its
complaint was dismissed. As the court noted, "[i]f
defendants exercised no control over the [offending]
instrumentality, then a remedy directed against them is of
little use."9°
Several recent cases have studied the applicability
of public nuisance law to the manufacture and
sale of
91
non-defective firearms. In Bubalo v. Navegar, two police
officers were shot when they responded to a suspected
breaking and entering. The surviving officer and the
family of the deceased officer brought a public nuisance
action against the manufacturer of the firearm used in
this crime, "a compact, lightweight, semi-automatic,
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paramilitary assault weapon." 92 The Bubalo plaintiffs
specifically alleged that defendant's actions in designing,
manufacturing, marketing, and selling a firearm that
purportedly appealed to criminals constituted a public
nuisance. In dismissing those claims as a matter of law,
the district court held that it was "reluctant to recognize a
new theory of nuisance liability without a more solid
foundation in Illinois decisional law. 9 3 The court also
observed that the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Martin v.
94
Harringtonand Richardson, Inc., that there could be no
liability for merely manufacturing dangerous products,
provided "ample justification for precluding the
application of Illinois nuisance law to reach a similar
result. ,95
96
Likewise, in Cincinnativ. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., an
Ohio trial court held that public nuisance "simply does
not apply to the design, manufacture and distribution of
a lawful product." Noting that the integrity of the entire
body of product liability law would be destroyed by
application of public nuisance principles to the design,
manufacture and sale of products, the court concluded
that "a party cannot be held liable in nuisance absent
controlS of,98
the activity which creates or maintains the
nuisance." This ruling is consistent with the limitations
that many states' common law places on public nuisance
liability.

V. These Limitations On Tort Actions Reflect
Sound Public Policy
Complaints which attempt to allege causes of
action in the absence of the requisite defect, duty,
proximate cause, or control over the offending product
distort the scope of tort law in any state beyond all
reasonable bounds and directly conflict with established
precedent. Under the guise of a tort action, plaintiffs in
these cases urge courts to impose an unprecedented duty
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on firearm manufacturers to limit the distribution of their
legally produced, non-defective handguns to "safe"
consumers of those products. Alternatively, plaintiffs
urge courts to impose strict or absolute liability on
firearm manufacturers for the intentional, criminal or
accidental misuse of their non-defective products by
individuals over whom the manufacturers have no
control and with whom they have no relationship.
In taking this position, plaintiffs immediately
come into direct, irreconcilable conflict with state and
federal public policy as expressed through their
respective legislatures. The lawful distribution of
firearms is highly regulated in this country, having been
addressed
by various legislatures for over one hundred
99
years. Moreover, firearm manufacture, distribution,
possession, ownership and use are highly controlled by
multiple layers of government. The constitutions and
statutory schemes of many states endorse an individual
right to own or possess firearms.100 In creating and
buttressing federal firearm regulations, the United States
Congress has declared that it did not thereby intend to
"discourage or eliminate the private ownership or use of
firearms by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes."'0 '
This legislative intent was recently reinforced by the
United States Supreme Court, which recognized that
"there is a long tradition of widespread lawful gun
ownership by private individuals in this country," and
that "despite their potential for 10
harm,
guns generally can
2
be owned in perfect innocence."
Plaintiffs dismiss existing statutory and regulatory
controls in an effort to judicially create wholly new and
unsupported limitations on and liability for the lawful
manufacture and sale of non-defective firearms. In the
process, plaintiffs implicitly urge courts to abandon an
extensive, long-standing and effective framework of
federal, state and local laws and administrative
regulations governing the manufacture, distribution, sale,
ownership and use of firearms. Specifically, plaintiffs
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would have courts abandon existing enactments that
have predetermined who may lawfully sell and who may
lawfully purchase and own handguns. By urging civil
liability for the lawful manufacture and distribution of
non-defective firearms within the existing framework of
public policy and legislation, some plaintiffs have
candidly made plain their primary goal in this litigation:
to end or to severely limit the manufacture and distribution
of legally produced, non-defective firearms. Such a goal
is clearly political in nature. It calls for action which is not
judicial, but rather lies well within the realm of the
legislature, where decisions can be democratically
reached after amassing the facts, hearing competing
viewpoints and allowing full and open debate.
Many courts have indicated their clear
understanding of this point, declining "to interfere with
the Legislature's exercise of authority in this area. ' 4 In
King, plaintiff was rendered paraplegic after being
intentionally shot with a handgun alleged to be a
"Saturday Night Special." 0 The King court rejected
plaintiffs' proposal to substitute their individual moral
judgments for the extensive, long-standing framework of
public policy reflected in federal, state and local laws and
regulations permitting the design, manufacture, sale and
ownership of legally sold, non-defective firearms of that
design.10 6 That opinion echoed the sentiments of many
courts, as summarized by a Pennsylvania trial court:
[o]nly the legislature should have the power to
regulate the sale of firearms on the market,
and decide whether they are so dangerous
that manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers
should be absolutely liable for injuries
resulting from their use. The jury should not
be able to speculate on whether handguns are
beneficial to society; that is a policy matter for
the legislature to decide.107
These decisions uphold the doctrine of separation
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of powers, which balances the various branches of an
effective system of democratic government. "The
doctrine of separation of powers prohibits courts from
exercising a legislative function by engaging in policy
decisions and making or revising rules or regulations."0 8
As James Madison recognized, judges must refrain from
lawmaking to avoid violating that basic tenet of tripartite
government. "Were the power of judging joined with the
legislative,.., the judge would then be the legislator. " 109
Although the United States Constitution does not
impose the doctrine of separation of powers on state
governments, that doctrine is implicitly embedded in
many of the states' Constitutions and in the manner in
which they organize their governments." 0 Suits that seek
to limit the lawful distribution of firearms of certain
designs or to exert global control over their already
highly regulated distribution violate the principle of
separation of powers by intruding the court into an
inherently legislative process.
The function of the courts is to deal with the
particular facts of specific situations while acting on a
case-by-case basis. The legislature is better equipped to
make policy decisions that will apply to all parties in
similar situations. The problems which may arise when
these functions are confused or commingled are
illustrated by the response of other courts to Kelley v. R.G.
Industries, Inc., in which the Maryland Court of Appeals
adopted a new theory of absolute liability for,111the
In
manufacturers of "Saturday Night Specials."
of
the
District
Court
for
rejecting this theory, the District
112
Columbia in Brady v. Hinckley, pointed to a series of
practical problems and unintended consequences caused
by the Kelley decision, including a practical restriction on
affected only
access to firearms for self-defense which 113
economically disadvantaged consumers. The court also
noted that the Maryland court's foray into an essentially
legislative arena created problems of a constitutional
proportion:
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All of the above suggests to this Court that
what is really being suggested by the plaintiffs
...is for this Court, or Courts, to indirectly
engage in legislating some form of gun
control. The pitfalls noted above seem to be
ample evidence, however, that such legislation
should be left to the federal and state
legislatures which are in the best position to
hold hearings and enact legislation which can
address all of the issues and concerns as well
as reflect the will of the citizens.'
When legislative efforts to change a substantive
body of law are not successful over time, it is tempting to
believe that appeal to a judicial forum may be effective.
Such reactions do unintended damage, however, by
undermining the premises upon which our tripartite
system of government rests, challenging the rights of
private companies to engage in lawful, regulated trade,
and altering the fundamental bases and limitations of tort
liability. Expansion of tort liability beyond its inherent
limitations would have a profound effect not only on
manufacturers of firearms, but on every person or entity
who makes, sells, distributes or uses products. Such a
startling departure from existing law should be taken
only after the most thorough and open debate in the
legislature occurs where voices of all concerned can be
heard.

Conclusion
Tort claims based on a specific product's design,
manufacture or warnings may result in improvements in
that product to the indirect benefit of consumers,
generally. This does not mean, however, that tort liability
can be effectively used to combat violence or to address
broader societal concerns. In short, there are limits on the
uses to which tort litigation involving products can and
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should be established. To the extent that litigants' actual
goals are political or legislative, the only constitutionally
permissible forum for those debates is likewise political
or legislative.
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